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Fb2 The Rise of Scientific Philosophy ePub

by Hans Reichenbach

Category: Humanities
Subcategory: Other
Author: Hans Reichenbach
ISBN: 0520010558
ISBN13: 978-0520010550
Language: English
Publisher: University of California Press; First edition (August 1, 1961)
Pages: 333
Fb2 eBook: 1442 kb
ePub eBook: 1435 kb
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Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) was a leading philosopher of science, educator and proponent of logical empiricism (he was the founder of the Berlin Circle ); he wrote other books such as The Rise of Scientific Philosophy The Philosophy of Space and Time.

Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) was a leading philosopher of science, educator and proponent of logical empiricism (he was the founder of the Berlin Circle ); he wrote other books such as The Rise of Scientific Philosophy The Philosophy of Space and Time.

author: Reichenbach,hans d. ate. classification: Philosophy d. itle: Thw Rise Of Scientific Philosophy. te: 2012-09-00 d. citation: 1945 d. dentifier. origpath: 28 d. copyno: 1 d.

Still, the personal issues aside, I think Reichenbach is right in claiming that philosophy has been transformed into logical empiricism.

This book represents a new approach to philosophy Professor Reichenbach, known for his many contributions to logic and the philosophy of science, addresses this book to a wider audience.

This book represents a new approach to philosophy. It treats philosophy as not a collection of systems, but as a study of problems. It recognizes in traditional philosophical systems the historical function of having asked questions rather than having given solutions. Professor Reichenbach, known for his many contributions to logic and the philosophy of science, addresses this book to a wider audience. He writes for those who do not have the leisure or preparation to read in the fields of mathematics, symbolic logic, or physics. Besides showing the principal foundations of the new philosophy, he has been careful to provide the necessary factual background.

The rise of. Scientific philosophy hans reichenbach. T he investigations of this book are intended to be objective in this sense. The rise of scientific philosophy. This presentation is written for the many who have read books on philosophy and science and were not satisfied; who have tried to find meanings but got stuck in a barrage of words; yet who have not abandoned hope that some day philosophy will become as cogent and as powerful as science. That such a scientific philosophy is already in exist­ ence is not yet sufficiently known.

Hans Reichenbach was a leading philosopher of science, a founder of the Berlin circle, and a. .Afterwards he wrote two popular books: Elements of symbolic logic (1947) and The rise of scientific philosophy (1951)

Hans Reichenbach was a leading philosopher of science, a founder of the Berlin circle, and a proponent of logical positivism (also known as neopositivism or logical empiricism). He is known for his philosophical investigations of Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, the theory of probability, the nature of space and time, the character of physical laws, and conventionalism in physical science. Afterwards he wrote two popular books: Elements of symbolic logic (1947) and The rise of scientific philosophy (1951).

The late Hans Reichenbach was Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles

The late Hans Reichenbach was Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles. His previous books include The Theory of Probability and Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (University of California Press); Elements of Symbolic Logic; Experience and Prediction; and Atom and Cosmos.

I read Reichenbach's Rise of Scientific Philosophy when I was a freshman in college, forty years ag. The first third is a history of philosophy and epistemology up until Kant, and shows you what true science is all about.

I read Reichenbach's Rise of Scientific Philosophy when I was a freshman in college, forty years ago. I have read many books over the years, but to this day I would say that this is the most influential book of my life. I started college as an ordinary Christian protestant. A philosophy course taught me about critical thinking. Carl Sagan's "The Demon-Haunted World".

Similar books and articles. HANS REICHENBACH - 1952 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (8):334-337. The Rise of Scientific Philosophy by Hans Reichenbach. W. Werkmeister - 1951 - Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 42:277-278. R. F. J. Withers - 1951 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 ():334.

This book represents a new approach to philosophy. It treats philosophy as not a collection of systems, but as a study of problems. It recognizes in traditional philosophical systems the historical function of having asked questions rather than having given solutions. Professor Reichenbach traces the failures of the systems to psychological causes.Speculative philosophers offered answers at a time when science had not yet provided the means to give true answers. Their search for certainty and for moral directives led them to accept pseudo-solutions. Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and many others are cited to illustrate the rationalist fallacy: reason, unaided by observation, was regarded as a source of knowledge, revealing the physical world and "moral truth." The empiricists could not disprove this thesis, for they could not give a valid account of mathematical knowledge.Mathematical discoveries in the early nineteenth century cleared the way for modern scientific philosophy. Its advance was furthered by discoveries in modern physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology. These findings have made possible a new conception of the universe and of the atom. The work of scientists thus altered philosophy completely and brought into being a philosopher with a new attitude and training. Instead of dictating so-called laws of reason to the scientist, this modern philosopher proceeds by analyzing scientific methods and results. He finds answers to the age-old questions of space, time, causality, and life; of the human observer and the external world. He tells us how to find our way through this world without resorting to unjustifiable beliefs or assuming a supernatural origin for moral standards. Philosophy thus is no longer a battleground of contradictory opinions, but a science discovering truth step by step.Professor Reichenbach, known for his many contributions to logic and the philosophy of science, addresses this book to a wider audience. He writes for those who do not have the leisure or preparation to read in the fields of mathematics, symbolic logic, or physics. Besides showing the principal foundations of the new philosophy, he has been careful to provide the necessary factual background. He has written a philosophical study, not a mere popularization. It contains within its chapters all the necessary scientific material in an understandable form―and, therefore, conveys all the information indispensable to a modern world-view.The late Hans Reichenbach was Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles. His previous books include
Comments to eBook The Rise of Scientific Philosophy
Ericaz
I am neither a scientist nor a philosopher, but I like to dabble in reading about both, so this is a great combination. If you are scientifically inclined and have any interest in philosophy, this book provides a lot of great insight. It's about 60 years old, so maybe there are more recent works that do a similar thing, but this withstands the tests of time.
Beazezius
Good price and condition.
Celen
Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) was a leading philosopher of science, educator and proponent of logical empiricism (he was the founder of the “Berlin Circle”); he wrote other books such as The Rise of Scientific Philosophy The Philosophy of Space and Time.

[NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 333-page paperback edition.]

He wrote in the Preface to this 1951 book, “Philosophy is regarded by many as inseparable from speculation. They believe that the philosopher cannot use methods which establish knowledge… that he must speak a language which is not accessible to verification---in short, that philosophy is not a science. The present book is intended to establish the contrary thesis. It maintains that philosophic speculation is a passing stage, occurring when philosophic problems are raised at a time which does not possess the logical means to solve them. It claims that there is, and always has been, a scientific approach to philosophy. And it wishes to show that from this ground has sprung a scientific philosophy which, in the science of our time, has found the tools to solve those problems that in earlier times have been the subject of guesswork only. To put it briefly, this book is written with the intention of showing that philosophy has proceeded from speculation to science.”

He observes, “Kant’s so-called antinomies, which essentially concern the infinity of space and time, have not stood up to the test of logic. They are easily solved by a logic that has learned to deal consistently with infinite numbers.” (Pg. 66) Later, he adds, “Kant’s system, though proved untenable by later developments, was the attempt of a giant mind to establish rationalism on a scientific basis. Hegel’s system is the poor construction of a fanatic who has seen one empirical truth and attempts to make it a logical law with the most unspecific of all logics.” (Pg. 72)

He says, “The history of scientific philosophy is the story of the development of problems. Problems are solved not through vague generalities, or picturesque descriptions of the relation between man and the world, but through technical work. Such work is done in the sciences, and in fact, the development of problems must be traced through the history of the individual sciences. Philosophical systems, at best, have reflected the stage of scientific knowledge of their day; but they have not contributed to the development of science. The logical development of problems is the work of the scientist; his technical analysis… has furthered the understanding of the problem until, eventually, the technical knowledge was complete enough to allow for the answer to philosophical questions.” (Pg. 117)

He points out, “From the investigation of modern quantum mechanics we know that the individual atomic occurrences do not lend themselves to a causal interpretation and are merely controlled by probability laws. This result, formulated in Heisenberg’s famous principle of indeterminacy, constitutes the proof … that the idea of a strict causality is to be abandoned, and that the laws of probability take over the place once occupied by the law of causality… The probability law is an ‘if-then in a certain percentage’ relation. Modern logic offers the means of dealing with such a relation, which in contradistinction to the IMPLICATION of usual logic is called a probability implication. The causal structure of the physical world is replaced by a probability structure, and the understanding of the physical world presupposes the elaboration of a theory of probability.” (Pg. 163-164)

He asserts, “it appears inadmissible to assume that living matter possesses properties which contradict those of living matter.” (Pg. 193) He continues, “Teleology is analogism, is pseudo explanation; it belongs in speculative philosophy, but has no place in scientific philosophy.” (Pg. 195) He ends this chapter with the statement, “Science is its own master and recognizes no authority beyond its confines.” (Pg. 214)

He argues, “the way this inductive inference is actually made has led some philosophers to a second form of misunderstanding. The scientist who discovers a theory is usually guided to his discovery by guesses; he cannot name a method by means of which he found the theory and can only say that it appeared plausible to him, that he had the right hunch, or that he saw intuitively which assumption would fit the facts. Some philosophers have misunderstood this psychological description of discovery as proving that there exists no logical relation leading from the facts to the theory; and they contend that no logical interpretation of the hypothetico-deductive method is possible… These philosophers do not see that the same scientist …presents [his theory] to others only after he sees that his guess is justified by the facts… The inductive inference is employed not for finding a theory, but for justifying it in terms of observational data. The mystical interpretation of the hypothetico-deductive method as an irrational guessing springs from a confusion of the context of discovery and context of justification. The act of discovery escapes logical analysis; there are no logical rules in terms of which a ‘discovery machine’ could be constructed that would take over the creative function of the genius. But it is not the logician’s task to account for scientific discoveries.” (Pg. 230-231)

He says, “Thus the statement that there is an objective physical world can only be maintained as highly probable, and not as absolutely certain. We have good inductive evidence for the existence of a physical world---but that is all that we can maintain. And it is meaningful to speak about an objective physical world because statements about such a world are inductively derivable from observations.” (Pg. 266)

He concludes, “there are philosophers who refuse to acknowledge scientific philosophy as a philosophy; who wish to incorporate its results into an introductory chapter of science and claim that there exists an independent philosophy, which has no concerns with scientific research and has direct access to truth. Such claims, I think, reveal a lack of critical judgment… They reserve the name of philosophy for their fallacious attempts at a superscientific knowledge and refuse to accept as philosophy a method of analysis designed after the pattern of scientific inquiry. What is required for a scientific philosophy is a reorientation of philosophic desires. Unless the aims of speculative philosophy are recognized as unattainable, the achievements of scientific philosophy cannot be understood.” (Pg. 305)

This is a marvelous exposition of this viewpoint, that will be "must reading" for anyone interestest in the philosophy of science, as well as scientific philosophy.
Debeme
Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) was a leading philosopher of science, educator and proponent of logical empiricism (he was the founder of the "Berlin Circle"); he wrote other books such as The Philosophy of Space and Time.

He wrote in the Preface to this 1951 book, "Philosophy is regarded by many as inseparable from speculation. They believe that the philosopher cannot use methods which establish knowledge... that he must speak a language which is not accessible to verification---in short, that philosophy is not a science. The present book is intended to establish the contrary thesis. It maintains that philosophic speculation is a passing stage, occurring when philosophic problems are raised at a time which does not possess the logical means to solve them. It claims that there is, and always has been, a scientific approach to philosophy. And it wishes to show that from this ground has sprung a scientific philosophy which, in the science of our time, has found the tools to solve those problems that in earlier times have been the subject of guesswork only. To put it briefly, this book is written with the intention of showing that philosophy has proceeded from speculation to science."

He observes, "Kant's so-called antinomies, which essentially concern the infinity of space and time, have not stood up to the test of logic. They are easily solved by a logic that has learned to deal consistently with infinite numbers." (Pg. 66) Later, he adds, "Kant's system, though proved untenable by later developments, was the attempt of a giant mind to establish rationalism on a scientific basis. Hegel's system is the poor construction of a fanatic who has seen one empirical truth and attempts to make it a logical law with the most unspecific of all logics." (Pg. 72)

He says, "The history of scientific philosophy is the story of the development of problems. Problems are solved not through vague generalities, or picturesque descriptions of the relation between man and the world, but through technical work. Such work is done in the sciences, and in fact, the development of problems must be traced through the history of the individual sciences. Philosophical systems, at best, have reflected the stage of scientific knowledge of their day; but they have not contributed to the development of science. The logical development of problems is the work of the scientist; his technical analysis... has furthered the understanding of the problem until, eventually, the technical knowledge was complete enough to allow for the answer to philosophical questions." (Pg. 117)

He points out, "From the investigation of modern quantum mechanics we know that the individual atomic occurrences do not lend themselves to a causal interpretation and are merely controlled by probability laws. This result, formulated in Heisenberg's famous principle of indeterminacy, constitutes the proof ... that the idea of a strict causality is to be abandoned, and that the laws of probability take over the place once occupied by the law of causality... The probability law is an `if-then in a certain percentage' relation. Modern logic offers the means of dealing with such a relation, which in contradistinction to the IMPLICATION of usual logic is called a probability implication. The causal structure of the physical world is replaced by a probability structure, and the understanding of the physical world presupposes the elaboration of a theory of probability." (Pg. 163-164)

He asserts, "it appears inadmissible to assume that living matter possesses properties which contradict those of living matter." (Pg. 193) He continues, "Teleology is analogism, is pseudo explanation; it belongs in speculative philosophy, but has no place in scientific philosophy." (Pg. 195) He ends this chapter with the statement, "Science is its own master and recognizes no authority beyond its confines." (Pg. 214)

He argues, "the way this inductive inference is actually made has led some philosophers to a second form of misunderstanding. The scientist who discovers a theory is usually guided to his discovery by guesses; he cannot name a method by means of which he found the theory and can only say that it appeared plausible to him, that he had the right hunch, or that he saw intuitively which assumption would fit the facts. Some philosophers have misunderstood this psychological description of discovery as proving that there exists no logical relation leading from the facts to the theory; and they contend that no logical interpretation of the hypothetico-deductive method is possible... These philosophers do not see that the same scientist ...presents [his theory] to others only after he sees that his guess is justified by the facts... The inductive inference is employed not for finding a theory, but for justifying it in terms of observational data. The mystical interpretation of the hypothetico-deductive method as an irrational guessing springs from a confusion of the context of discovery and context of justification. The act of discovery escapes logical analysis; there are no logical rules in terms of which a `discovery machine' could be constructed that would take over the creative function of the genius. But it is not the logician's task to account for scientific discoveries." (Pg. 230-231)

He says, "Thus the statement that there is an objective physical world can only be maintained as highly probable, and not as absolutely certain. We have good inductive evidence for the existence of a physical world---but that is all that we can maintain. And it is meaningful to speak about an objective physical world because statements about such a world are inductively derivable from observations." (Pg. 266)

He concludes, "there are philosophers who refuse to acknowledge scientific philosophy as a philosophy; who wish to incorporate its results into an introductory chapter of science and claim that there exists an independent philosophy, which has no concerns with scientific research and has direct access to truth. Such claims, I think, reveal a lack of critical judgment... They reserve the name of philosophy for their fallacious attempts at a superscientific knowledge and refuse to accept as philosophy a method of analysis designed after the pattern of scientific inquiry. What is required for a scientific philosophy is a reorientation of philosophic desires. Unless the aims of speculative philosophy are recognized as unattainable, the achievements of scientific philosophy cannot be understood." (Pg. 305)

This is a marvelous exposition of this viewpoint, that will be "must reading" for anyone interestest in the philosophy of science, as well as scientific philosophy.
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