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by Anders Frankson,Niklas Zetterling

Category: Military
Subcategory: History books
Author: Anders Frankson,Niklas Zetterling
ISBN: 0714681032
ISBN13: 978-0714681030
Language: English
Publisher: Routledge (2004)
Pages: 288
Fb2 eBook: 1356 kb
ePub eBook: 1463 kb
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Kursk 1943 Frankson, Anders Zetterling, Niklas Taylor&Francis 9780714681030 : The battle at Kursk in. .This volume makes extensive use of German archival documents as well as various Russian books and articles.

Kursk 1943 Frankson, Anders Zetterling, Niklas Taylor&Francis 9780714681030 : The battle at Kursk in 1943 is often referred to as the greatest tank battle in the history of warfare.

Niklas Zetterling's main point is that in regard to personnel and material loss that there was nothing decisive about the battle of Kursk. It was a very interesting battle and important at an operational level but the losses inflicted on the German army, especially armor, have been vastly overstated.

Zetterling and Frankson have published the first comprehensive . That he thinks glantz is ccorrect over zetterling book which came out in 2000.

An important dissent to this conclusion, however, has recently been raised by Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson in their landmark study Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. Zetterling and Frankson have published the first comprehensive examination of the strength and losses of the contending armies based completely on archival sources, both German and Russian. Eschewing drama for meticulous detail, the authors have created an important (one is tempted to say definitive) reference work that deserves to have a serious impact on all subsequent writing about Kursk.

Электронная книга "Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis", Anders Frankson, Niklas Zetterling

Электронная книга "Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis", Anders Frankson, Niklas Zetterling. Эту книгу можно прочитать в Google Play Книгах на компьютере, а также на устройствах Android и iOS. Выделяйте текст, добавляйте закладки и делайте заметки, скачав книгу "Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis" для чтения в офлайн-режиме.

Kursk 1943 A Statistical Analysis book. Along with Anders Frankson he has previously written Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis and The Korsun Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944. Books by Niklas Zetterling

Frankson, anders; zetterling, niklas.

Frankson, anders; zetterling, niklas. Published by Routledge (2000). ISBN 10: 0714650528 ISBN 13: 9780714650524.

Personal Name: Zetterling, Niklas. All rights are reserved by their owners. Download book Kursk 1943 : a statistical analysis, Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson. Publication, Distribution, et. London ; Portland, Or. Frank Cass, (c)2000.

Several books have appeared that completely destroy the Kursk myth but the first one to exhaustively debunk the myth was ‘Kursk 1943: A Statistical analysis’ by Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson. This book looks at all the important aspects of the battle such as the assembly of forces, strength and loss statistics, performance of tanks, operational plans, what if scenarios. The greatest strength of the book lies in the use of official German records for all the statistics concerning the German forces

Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. Anders Frankson, Niklas Zetterling. The battle at Kursk in 1943 is often referred to as the greatest tank battle in the history of warfare.

Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis.

Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2000). Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. Archived from the original on 2014-09-11. Retrieved 1 November 2014.

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Comments to eBook Kursk 1943
Quynaus
Most people call this the Zetterling book and I will do so as well, my apologies to Anders Frankson, I do not know who contributed which content. Niklas Zetterling's main point is that in regard to personnel and material loss that there was nothing decisive about the battle of Kursk. It was a very interesting battle and important at an operational level but the losses inflicted on the German army, especially armor, have been vastly overstated.

Since this book was first published in 2000, this last point is most likely understood by now but I still highly recommend reading it because there is a lot more information of substance and it is packed into a very readable 288 pages. It will increase your knowledge of this battle and the war in general. I am an American who admires the Red Army's great come from behind victory on the eastern front. I mention this because contrary to what I have read in some places, I do not see this book as having a pro-German bias. I do have a criticism that I will post as a comment on my review. If I post it here, it will appear more negative then I intend it to be. I believe that the author's primary point is sound. I bought this on Kindle for $33 and I am pleased with the purchase. While I sometimes come to a different conclusion than the author, I trust his data and I like his methodology. I also concur with with Steven C. Johnson's concise review of Zetterling's book.

Here is one example, of why I like the way Zetterling presents his data. In a discussion of the opposing air forces he mentions the Russian IL-2 armed with the new PTAB mini bombs and casually mentions that it had a reputation for being a great tank killer. He then points out that 100,000 of these were dropped at Zitadelle and says 'even if you accept that 3,000 German tanks were actually damaged and assumed that all of them were damaged by this one weapon, does it deserve its reputation?' That is far more memorable then saying, '100,000 PTAB's were dropped at Zitadelle'. Now I saw a Russian made documentary that pointed out that these were dropped in clusters of 196 so this would equate to about 500 attacks and this figure may even include IL-2's that were lost before delivering their payload. More importantly, this was an alternative to dropping one large 100lb bomb that almost always missed its target. Considering it was the first use of PTAB's, perhaps it was a good weapon after all. In any case this was a very interesting and thought provoking way of introducing the topic. The information was accurate and all because I am leaning towards a different conclusion does not make me critical of the author. He has a knack for introducing statistics in a context that makes them meaningful.

I found his analysis of the Panther tank convincing and I liked the way he compared the German and Soviet armor. Rather than just give raw measurements, he described how they measured up in battle and where each army was in their development cycle. Incidentally, the Germans were better off here. They were deploying their second generation armor while the Russians were still fielding their first generation and only just starting to produce/design some of their next generation armor. There are many other interesting topics like this covered in the book.

This is definitely one of the books you should get on the ever fascinating Battle of Kursk that examines it from the German point of view (which is not the same as bias). I have also purchased the Zamulin book and look forward to reading an in depth view of the Russian operations. Zetterling stakes out a valuable piece of territory here that should not be overlooked.
Karon
Excellent book, filled with a most through analysis of the battle unavailable from any other source. This book dispels any number of rumours and misconceptions, largely based on the Russian interpretation of the battle, rather than from German sources which although available in most case sloppy work and in German caused therm to be ignored.
Manesenci
It demonstrate the myth of Kursk. However the book lacks sinthesis and alternative explanations about the eastern front and ru
Mot
Essential resource for any authentic consideration of this incredibly significant event!
Samardenob
This book rather than being narrative history is analytical history. The general histories of the was in German Russian war tell a similar story. In 1941 the Germans were able to launch an offensive all along their line. They tried to defeat the Russians in a war of annihilation. This effort failed despite inflicting enormous Russian casualties. In 1942 the Germans were not able to build up their army to the levels of 1941 as they had also suffered combat losses. Instead they aimed a more limited offensive with the strategic aim of destroying Russian oil production. This failed and in 1943 the Germans could no longer win the war and any offensive they launched would be limited. In fact a spoiling offensive at Kursk was launched. The offensive has as a primary aim in causing Soviet casualties and preventing them launching significant offensive operations. The traditional story goes on that the Germans lost the battle of Kursk, suffered significant casualties to their armor and were not able to defend against Russian attacks which followed up the battle.

This pattern of history is shown by this short book of only some 143 pages(of narrative the rest is appendices) is simply wrong. In 1943 the Germans lost the assistance of most of their allies. Italy had left the war and large numbers of the Romanian and Hungarian troops had been killed in the Stalingrad operations. However they were able to replace the allied troops with freshly recruited Germans. They were also able to replace most of their lost tanks and other vehicles. In 1943 the quality of their armor was superior to what it had been the previous year. They had about 3 million troops available which was a bit higher than in 1942.

Thus the reason for how 1943 played out was nothing to do with attrition of the German forces. The reality is that in 1942 the Russians launched offensives around Kharhov and the Kerch peninsula in the Crimea. These offensives were costly failures with the Russians losing some 600,000 men. The loses were also concentrated in the southern part of their defensive system. The success of the Germans in 1942 was made possible by these losses. The defeat of the Russians meant that it was easy to break through their weakened defensive system.

In 1943 the Russians failed to commit suicide by launching such costly pre-emptive actions. Instead they fortified their line, kept troops in reserve and waited for the German onslaught. Even then the losses that were inflicted on the attacking German forces at Kursk were minor. The big German losses occurred in the subsequent offensives after Kursk was called off. One of the books strengths is the detailed figures which show exactly what losses occurred and when.
A number of other myths have also been exploded. Kursk used to be considered one of the biggest tank battles of the war. However a detailed examination of the forces employed showed that no real big tank battle actually occurred.

One of the key debates is whether the Germans should have launched the Kursk offensive. Manstien the German commander had at the beginning of 1943 launched a series of battles known as the backhand blow which blunted and defeated the Russian attempts to take the Ukraine. Should the German's in 1943 attempted to fight a similar defensive battle. One of the interesting things explained in the book was the problems that the German's might have with a mobile defense. Whilst in the south they a reasonable ration of mobile or motorized divisions at the front in the north and the centre of the line most of the divisions were infantry ones. The ability of the Germans to fight a mobile defence was limited to one part of their defensive system. In addition Hitler did not want to give up production centers close to the front.

The book is a fascinating discussion of military history which is richer for not being a simple narrative.
Jarortr
What the author try to tell in this book is that it was the heavy German losses at Kursk that turned the tide in the east against the Germans - it was the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Soviets and there ability to absorb losses both in men and materiel due to supply of manpower and western allied material help that turned the tide. Despite the forward warning of the German attack and a meticulous planning by the Stavka the Germans made good headway and suffered light losses compared to the Soviets. Instead, it was the Soviet couterattacks at other sectors of the front that forced the Germans to break of the offensive. The Germans simply did not posses the manpower necessary to attack on one sector and defend against massive Soviet attacks on another.

There is a companion volume, unfortunately in Swedish only still, that deals exhaustively with their re-evaluation of the battle on the basis of the statistics. Their conclusion is that the German more flexible organisation and command system was far superior to the Soviet system, but with the numbers turning against them it did not help.
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